In my opinion this article “Data breaches, phishing, or malware? Understanding the risks of stolen credentials” by researchers from Google et al., is impressive: hard data which should make all of us (IT security practitioners) think and help improve the security of IT services, now.
It is spring again, and it is time for reports on IT Security or in-Security in 2016.
One thing caught my eye this year, and I am not sure if it is a trend, just a coincidence or my susceptibility: I noticed a comeback of fileless malware, also called counter-intuitively “non-malware”. This is malware which does not install itself on the filesystem of the target machine but instead can load part of itself in memory (RAM), uses tools of the Operating System (PowerShell, WMI etc.) and local applications, hides parameters and data for example in the Widows Registry.
Actually there is nothing really new here, the very old “macros viruses” were of this type. What has changed is that today personal computers and servers run for very long time (very few people switch completely off their computers daily, usually personal computers are just set to “sleep”), which gives a much longer persistence to this type of malware. Obviously fileless malware is more difficult to write and to maintain, but it is also more difficult to identify, that is it has more chances to escape detection by anti-malware and anti-virus programs. Moreover also pure behavioural analysis can be fooled by this type of malware, since it can use standard tools of the machine performing tasks just a little bit out of the ordinary. On the other side, in case of infection the malware is anyway present on the machine, so anti-malware tools have just to look better to find it.
Since at least the ’70s, the time of Multics (see eg. this old document on the vulnerability analysis of Multics security), the Orange Books, Military IT security etc., the role of hardware in IT security has been discussed, evaluated and implemented.
In the last years the discussion has risen again in particular about the possibility of hardware backdoors and malicious hardware. For example, since the publication of the Snowden documents there have been rumors about possible hardware backdoors in Intel, AMD and Cisco products.
A few days ago at the 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy has been presented this paper (see eg. also here for a summary) describing how to implement a Hardware Backdoor called Analog Malicious Hardware which, as of today, seems practically impossible to detect. The researchers were able to add a tiny circuit composed by a capacitor and a few transistors wrapped up in a single gate, out of the millions or billions in a modern chip, which acts as the hardware Trojan horse.
How difficult could it be to add a single, almost undetectable gate to the blue prints of a chip at the chip factory? How can be verified that similar gates are not present on a chip?
PS. 10 years ago I gave a couple of seminars in Italian about some aspects of history of IT security and I looked into some issues of how hardware must support the security features of Operating Systems; if interested some slides and a paper (in Italian) can be found here and here.
Monitoring outgoing traffic to detect intrusions in IT systems is not a new concept but often it does not seem to be enough appreciated, understood and implemented.
IT security defences cannot guarantee us against every possibile attack, so we must be prepared to the event of an intrusion and to manage the associated incident.
The first step in incident management is to detect an intrusion. Traditional tools like Anti-Virus, Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) etc. do their job but they can be bypassed. But intrusions can also be detected by monitoring the outgoing traffic.
In my recent personal experience, some intrusions have been detected and stopped because the outgoing traffic was monitored and blocked. Since the deployed malware was not able to call back home, it did not do anything and there was no damage; and since the outgoing traffic was monitored, the intrusion was immediately detected.
But monitoring the outgoing traffic to detect intrusions is becoming more and more difficult. For example attackers are adopting more often stealth techniques like using fake DNS queries. An interesting example has been recently described by FireEye in “MULTIGRAIN – POINT OF SALE ATTACKERS MAKE AN UNHEALTHY ADDITION TO THE PANTRY” . In this case, malware is exfiltrating data by making DNS calls to domains with names like log.<encoded data to exfiltrate>.evildomain.com . Obviously the DNS query fails, but in the logs of the receiving DNS server it is written the name of the requested domain, that is the data that the malware is exfiltrating.
As attackers are getting more creative to hide the back communication between malware and their Command & Control services, IT Security will need to devise more proactive approaches to monitoring and blocking outgoing traffic.
It is worth reading this script “Hacking Your Phone” from CBS 60 Minutes aired on April 17, 2016.
SS7 vulnerabilities are not new and should be known to the carriers. As usual the problem is on patching and implementing security measures to prevent illegal access to the network (in this demonstration they were legally granted access to SS7).
Malware and what it can do on phones, tablets, PCs etc. should be well known, at least to those who care about IT security.
This describes a new kind of IT ransom which should be much more professional and profitable.
The attacker manages to access some company’s servers, then encrypts the data in the databases but he modifies the DBs access routines to encrypt/decrypt on the fly all data with his own encryption key. In this way for the company all continues to work. He then waits a few months so that all DB backups are encrypted with his keys and at this point deletes the encryption keys from the company’s systems and asks for a ransom to give it back.Notice that backups are unusable because they too are encrypted with the attacker key.
Obviously, strong IT security procedures should prevent and detect this, from off-line testing of backups to intrusion detection.
Cryptolocker and similar malware are getting more and more common. The latest versions that appeared work on also Android (one id called Simplelocker). In general what they do is to encrypt some or most of the files on your PC, tablet or smartphone, in particular text, sound, images and video files, which of course includes all your music video library.
Been a ransom, you are asked to pay some bitcoins (or similar untraceable currency) to get your files decrypted.The only defense, a part from keeping your PC clean, up-to-date, with good anti- … whatever … and being very careful on what you click and the email you open, is to keep very updated backups. Indeed once you get infected and locked / encrypted, there is absolutely nothing that you can do to decrypt the files (unless of course if you pay).
The only precaution is to have good and recent backups, and start all-over again from scratch.
But there is a very important point to remember here, not all backups are equal! Good backups are only those done on off-line media, like dvd, blu-ray disks, external usb disks that are connected only for the time of making the backup, and so on. In technical term it is often called an air-gapped backup, that is a storage that you cannot usually access from your device. This excludes most of the Clod storage and backup systems!
The reason for this is that if the backup is on a continuously or very often connected device, and the backup is done automatically as soon as new data is on your device, when the ransomware encrypts your file, the encrypted version is automatically copied on the backup device substituting the original data, and you can end up having also the backup data encrypted.
This announcement by US-CERT made me think about the current status of the war (I think that at the moment this is actually the correct word) between attackers / thieves / fraudsters and ICT Security practitioners, Banks, FInancial Institutes etc.
Recently we have seen banking malware using Tor hidden services to hide C2C (Command-and-Control) servers, or as described in the US-CERT announcement, P2P (peer-to-peer) networks. The purpose is the same, to hide the controlling master of the malware, that is the attacker / thief / fraudster her/himself. This also means that recently security practitioners, law enforcement and bank personnel got very good in finding and at least disrupting the C2C servers, otherwise there would be no need to find new ways of hiding them.
But how is this war going, that is, who is winning? Let’s be clear, we, the good guys, are losing.
At first sight the reason for this is simple: there are just too many bugs in today’s software (and possibly in hardware, or at least in embedded software in hardware) and new bugs are added at such a rate that our efforts to ‘secure’ the software are improving the situation a little but not much. It is just a never-ending chase: find a bug, exploit the bug, fix the bug – repeat… It is true that bugs are getting more difficult to find, that software developers are getting better in writing software and fixing bugs, that Bugs-Bounties are awarded to bugs discoverers from software houses etc., but the same happens on the other side and a real market of exploits (to which even secret services and the like participate) of unknown (also called 0-day) bugs exists and flourishes.
In this situation the approach that it is often adopted to protect financial transactions online (web-based) is to balance the costs of defensive measures with the losses to attackers. In the losses one should consider both those direct and those indirect, like bad publicity and loss of customers. Investing too much in some defensive measures could work but could also be a waste of money since the next attack can just avoid the expensive defensive measure and exploit some other bugs or flow in the process or, even worse, human weakness.
This really looks like a never ending cat-and-mouse game.
Symantec has released here information about a new kind of Linux backdoor found on broken-in Linux servers.
The most interesting point is the use of injecting data in normal SSH traffic for communication, without opening new network ports nor adding new daemons to the process list.
It would be interesting to learn more about it.
Some news of this week that caught my eye:
- A claim for a new “indestructible” rootkit: BadBIOS: true or advertisement? See here.
- Lavabit and Silent Circle join forces in the Dark Mail Alliance to create a really secure end-to-end email service. See here.
- Amazon will build a 600M USD cloud for the CIA, IBM is not too happy about that… See here.
- Bitcoin “crisis” and the advent of Litecoin, what is it going on in the world of online currencies? See here for a report and here for the latest news.